Rob Mottram at Robust UK examines the door specification implications of Martyn’s Law (AKA the Terrorism Act 2025), in larger educational and public venues.

Martyn’s Law – formally known as the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025 – received Royal Assent last year and comes into force in Spring 2027. For architects and specifiers working on schools, colleges and other larger public venues, it introduces a new layer of design responsibility that sits alongside existing fire and life safety requirements.

Martyn’s Law is built around a deceptively simple principle: venues must take proactive steps to protect people from terrorist attacks. For larger venues such as those with a capacity of 800 or more, which encompasses most secondary schools, sixth form colleges, universities, theatres and other leisure buildings, this means implementing procedural and physical protective measures, as well as training staff and being able to demonstrate a credible, tested security plan. Doors are the physical expression of that plan: they determine who can get in, how quickly a building can be secured and how people escape if something goes wrong. A door schedule that hasn’t been thought through in security terms leaves a gap that no amount of procedural planning can close.

Four functions to design around

Historically, door specification in education buildings has been driven by fire compliance and budget, with security treated as an add-on if it is considered at all. Martyn’s Law asks specifiers to think in terms of four distinct functions and to map every door in a scheme against them.

The first is entry control, which is managed access at the perimeter and at key internal thresholds. Second is zoning and compartmentalisation, as internal doors need to break up circulation and create protected areas. Thirdly, lockdown capability needs to be considered. Doors need to be secured quickly and reliably to shelter occupants in place. Finally, escape routes – doors should be specified that guarantee fast, unimpeded egress without compromising external security.

Few existing school buildings and venues were designed with this framework in mind, which makes early-stage audit work an essential part of any refurbishment or extension project.

Evacuation & ‘invacuation’ aren’t the same design problem

One distinction that is easy to miss on paper, but is critical in practice is the difference between evacuation (moving people out) and invacuation (moving people to shelter within the building). Many hostile threat scenarios call for invacuation rather than evacuation, which means the doors serving refuge areas need to resist forced entry for long enough to allow emergency services to respond, while still allowing instant, single-action egress from inside if conditions change.

This is a genuine design challenge, not a hardware afterthought. A doorset that has to resist attack from one side while guaranteeing free escape from the other needs to be specified and tested as a complete system – leaf, frame and hardware together – rather than assembled from components chosen independently.

What assessors will look for

The Act doesn’t prescribe a specific doorset standard, but it does require the responsible person to evidence a proportionate level of protection. In practice, that means specifiers should be building the following into their door schedules:

• Third-party certified doorsets are specified and tested as a single system rather than combined from separate suppliers
• Resistance ratings matched to a site specific risk assessment, rather than a blanket specification across the building.
• Locking systems proven to perform reliably under stress and high daily use.
• Fire and security performance that has been reconciled at design stage, not left to cause issues on site.
• Panic hardware on escape routes – halls, dining areas, sports facilities, main corridors – that is robust, tamper-resistant and simple to operate under pressure.

Where retrofit falls short

In the case of existing buildings, there is often pressure to upgrade hardware on existing door leaves, rather than full replace. A higher specification lock fitted to a leaf that was never designed to resist forced entry does not create a secure doorset if the leaf lacks structural integrity; the hardware is largely irrelevant. Mixing certified and uncertified components can leave a building in a compromised position that is arguably worse than no upgrade at all.

At main entrances, reception areas, external access points and designated lockdown spaces, full doorset replacement with a certified, tested system is usually the only specification that will stand scrutiny.

For many larger venues, we typically recommend certified steel doorsets at key external and high-risk internal locations. We also recommend internal steel doorsets for zoning, lockdown areas and protected corridors, which provide controlled access whilst supporting lockdown procedures without creating barriers to normal circulation. It is essential that compliance be built into the specification, not retrofitted, not assumed and not dependent on the weakest component in an ad hoc assembly.

Designing for the future

Doors in large venues, such as schools, colleges, leisure and hospitality buildings, are subject to heavy daily use, so a doorset’s performance under constant operational stress matters as much as its rating on day one. Specifying certified steel doorsets at high-risk external and internal locations, and using internal steel doorsets for zoning and lockdown areas that support lockdown procedures without obstructing normal circulation, provides a building fabric that retains its compliance over time.

Rob Mottram, is head of product & compliance at Robust UK